The towns of Villamontes and Yacuiba, located in the southern state of Tarija, erupted on the afternoon of Tuesday April 17th when protesters from the province of Gran Chaco raided gas pipeline pumping stations in efforts to turn off control valves. For the following 24 hours, chaos reigned—gas company facilities were vandalized and looted, police were taken hostage and gas flow to two regions of Bolivia was cut and daily export to Argentina was reduced by 75%. The Bolivian government admitted it had lost control in the region.

Police and military response left 24 wounded and 37 year-old Ermas Ruiz bled to death after a bullet hit his leg. By Wednesday night there was relative calm, though road blockades continued and gas export flow was not normalized until mid-day on Saturday April 21st, costing Bolivia almost $1 million in lost revenue (which the government demands that the municipalities involved must compensate).

The incident has to do with Bolivia’s third largest exploited reserve, Santa Margarita. The Repsol-run facility produces 50 million cubic feet of natural gas daily—an amount set to increase because of promised Argentine development such that Santa Margarita may soon generate $100 million dollars in taxes annually.

The site, though, sits at the border between two of Tarija’s provinces, Gran Chaco and O’Connor. Both claim territorial rights to the field—and to the royalties the hosting province receives. Both demand that the government determine boundaries once and for all, but for months Bolivian government and Tarija officials have ping-ponged decision-making responsibility back and forth. Tension and protests increased, escalating into last week’s chaos.

While the conflict appears to be a neighborly spat over local funding, the dispute demonstrates that nationalization’s execution has been anything but smooth.

First, there’s the technical side. Last October 28th, the government signed new contracts with all foreign hydrocarbon companies operating in Bolivia such that the state now receives $2 billion annually in royalties and taxes rather than the $250 million earned yearly since privatization in 1997.

However, months ago, documents were discovered to be riddled with serious editing errors and so needed complete overhaul. Only last week, did they gain legislative approval. President Morales signed the revised contracts into law on Monday night April 23rd—177 days after nationalization was supposed to have been completed.

Similarly delayed is the re-structuring of the state oil and gas company, YPFB. The company is on its fourth president in the last 15 months (one resigned out of frustration, the other two booted amidst scandal), and has yet to become a leader in defining or implementing gas policy—a central element of the nationalization plan.

Producing tangible affects in people’s lives has also been complicated.

For example, the country still lives frequent gas shortages. Though triggered by floods in supply regions or a pipeline problems, the underlying cause is a lack of national infrastructure. Year of energy agreements that allowed foreign companies to prioritize export and all but disregard the internal demand mean that there isn’t the capacity to get enough gas to Bolivians themselves.

Of the increased state revenue, some goes directly to the people—like in the form of Bono Juancito Pinto, a yearly 200bs ($25) stipend for every school-age child to help buy clothing and supplies.

But most of the sale royalties are diverted to state, provincial and municipal governments in the form of the Direct Hydrocarbon Tax (IDH in its Spanish initials) that goes towards anything from healthcare to education to road maintenance.

It’s this distribution causes discontent and fuels the Tarija conflict. The Gran Chaco province currently receives a bigger pieces of Tarija’s IDH pie (45% of the total, leaving 55% for the other two), aggravating O’Connor residents already annoyed about the gas field’s location.

So while the confrontation has deep visible roots, many aspects of the incident remain cloudy.

Minister of Government Alfredo Rada stated that the central government authorized the use of gas and rubber bullets, not lethal fire—a stance affirmed by Chief of the Armed Forces, Wilfredo Vargas. Yet one man died from a bullet wound and Gran Chaco Civic Committee leaders showed on-scene television cameras empty bullet casings scattered throughout the conflict area.

Who’s responsible is also in debate. Local groups blame the Bolivian government for ignoring escalating tension. Ruling-party MAS says that rightwing politicians from eastern Bolivia conspired to instigate conflict and claims that Tarija’s state government, led opposition party member Mario Cossio, financed the protests to create political instability.

On Monday April 23rd, mayors from cities in O’Connor and Gran Chaco, citizen groups, Governor Cossio, and parliamentary representatives sat at negotiating table discussions presided over by Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera. The groups agreed to comply with an independent judicial ruling, suspend direct action measures and to also elaborate a consensual agreement on the issue.

But the dispute over dividing nationalization’s benefits remain unresolved.

“We understand that our country’s mayors request that the distribution of economic resources be improved,” President Morales said on April 22 after meeting with 80 MAS mayors. “But this is the Constitutional Assembly’s task. The new way in which economic resources, specifically those that come from our natural resources, will be distributed is in their hands.”

The Constitutional Assembly is schedule to finish its year-long work in August, but has yet to agree on even one article of the over 200 the new constitution will contain. Meanwhile, the list of those who lose their lives or limbs in conflicts over the natural resource continues to grow.