The DA is convinced that the primary accused, ex-President Gonzalo “Goni” Sánchez de Lozada, had a strategy to guarantee himself impunity. And Dr. Milton Mendoza has some facts to back that up: just weeks after a popular uprising in February 2003 (against a proposed income tax hike), the then-President pushed a new law regarding “trials of responsibility” through Congress. That is, he altered the legal process used in cases against state functionaries. The outcome was law comprised of five partial and ambiguous articles that, if anything, prevent a clear definition of legal procedures in such cases.
Moreover, when Mendoza took charge of the case in 2005, he discovered that its documents had not been well take care of—to say the least. He was forced to spend almost two months just ordering the archives and he had to fight with colleagues in order to undo the various traps that they had created to impede the case against those who carried out massacre.
Examples abound.
According to the law, a “trial of responsibility” is technically brought by the Attorney General of the Republic. Independently, as is the case here, a group of district attorneys then carry out the investigation, providing the real substance to the suit. Since the beginning of this legal process in October 2004, three men have held this position in charge of investigation. All three, for various reasons, have hindered or distorted the trial against the ex-President—one even went to such an extreme as to of accuse Goni of sexual assault.
The first in the list, Oscar Crespo Soliz, was appointed to his position by Sánchez de Lozada himself and was a complete cynic. When it became necessary for the Bolivian National Congress to authorized the indictments, in a document dated November 21, 2003, Crespo Soliz described the suit as a “political trial.” As Milton Mendoza explains, this was a clear effort to “invalidate any possibility of a future extradition from the US. Because, we well know, you can not be extradited if the crime you are accused of is ‘political.’”
Investigations and negligent behavior was the norm for over a year and a half, until Mendoza and his team took the reigns. This group has now begun to battle against other institutions, such as the Supreme Court, so that the procedures and jurisprudence be respected and so that the case can follow its course.
On July 17, 2005, Mendoza was finally able to indict the 9 members of Goni’s last cabinet. Of course, Goni remains hidden in the United States and so the Bolivian legal system was not able to get him just yet. “And [the cabinet’s indictment] was for several crimes, not just genocide which was the original charge that began this all,” he explained.
Several former cabinet members were Senators at the time of the indictment. Measures were therefore taken to prevent against their possible flight or in some cases to hold their property and savings under a watchful judicial eye. Quite embarrassing for our dear Senators…
But the biggest victory that Mendoza wrangles, at least initially, was against the military officers: he subjected the uniformed men to placed shamefully under a civilian court’s purview. The Armed Forces at first resisted disclosing their archival documents as well. “For years there was these military papers were classified as Secret and many acts throughout Bolivia’s history have gone without punishment because of this,” the DA noted.
After a year of tug of war with the military, Milton Mendoza and his team managed to indict five generals implicated in the September and October 2003 events. Two were central Commanders of the Armed Forces—Generals Roberto Claros and Gonzalo Rocabado—and the rest were in charge of specific units: Luis Aranda Granados (Air Force), Osvaldo Quiroga Mendoza (Navy) and Juan Véliz Herrera (Army).
All of them, say the DA, received civil orders which, upon implementation, provoked the deaths and injuries of hundreds of people in El Alto and other places.
The last to be indicted were Goni, Carlos Sánchez Berzaín (his Defense Minister) and Jorge Berindoague (Health Minister and government spokesman during the last days of Goni’s presidency). The three fled to the U.S. on October 17, 2003 and it was no longer possible to continue the suit against them: knowing of their pending charges, the three avoided being located and notified there in order to not be subject to lawsuit. Mendoza was able to demonstrate this bad faith fact and in doing so, the Supreme Court was obligated to declare the three “in absentia” and issue warrants for their arrest.
That is, Milton Mendoza and his people were finally able to get to former President whose personal fortune amounts to at least $220 million dollars. He also got to Goni’s accomplices, who among others you will find the so-called “Zorro” Sánchez Berzaín—torturer, trained intelligence agent who for years functioned as Sánchez de Lozada’s right had. And for the first time in five decades, Mendoza was able to hold five generals responsible for their actions. But wait: isn’t this a little dangerous?
Yes, it is, replies Mendoza. “After the entry into Sánchez de Lozada’s home, several graffittis started showing up along the highway from La Paz to El Alto. They alluded to my name and position, saying that I should die: ‘Death to DA Milton Mendoza.’ This is no longer one person writing their message to me, but people being paid to write a repeated threat.” The same thing happened to DA Mirna Arancibia, who works on the case with Mendoza.
Mendoza’s tires have also been slashed on more than one occasion. Another person, however, paid an even higher price for trying to tamper with the rich’s comfort and impunity: a police captain Aldo Herrera and field officer for DA and with whom he had a friendship died on Sunday June 17th in a strange transit accident in the city of El Alto. The incident gets even more odd when after the disaster, as this journalist confirmed, the captain’s lap-top “was lost,” and along with it various important materials related to his investigative work.
A few days later, on Monday June 25th, Milton Mendoza resigned as spokesman for the Attorney Genera’s Office in the case against Sánchez de Lozada and his collaborators. The lack of security guarantees and the absence of support by the Attorney General himself, Mario Uribe, were the primary reasons. So despite the fact that he will no longer make public declarations in regards to the case, he will continue on in charge of the investigation.
The case will follow its course. Surely there are more obstacles than this article has been able to convey, but the suit continue. At this very moment, Milton Mendoza is working on the final phases of the investigation and taking the last depositions necessary, as Mario Uribe stated a few days ago. There is still one more implicated person to be questioned and some pending formalities, but everything else indicates that we are in the last lap of this difficult process.
Yet Mendoza knows full well that the hardest part is still to come. UB was able to verify that just a few weeks ago, Mario Uribe did one of the only effective things he’s done in a while. The Attorney General instructed Mendoza and Arancibia, as DA’s working on the case, to prepare two key documents: the extradition order for Goni and his two former cabinet members hiding in the U.S. and to elaborate the Conclusive Requirement—in other words, to write up the formal charges against those who perpetuated the Gas War massacres.
Once the formal charges are made, the oral trial will begin with sessions in which, like in the movies, Milton Mendoza will be obligated to proved that Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada carried out genocide in 2003 with the support of various politicians and armed forces higher-ups. The outcome is difficult to guess. But four years after the massacres ended the lives of 67 and mistreated hundreds others and after an hour interview with the man in charge of the case, this correspondent says without any doubt that this DA is willing to risk life and limb in order to achieve his primary objective: justice.
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