October 6, 2008
Español
The Burned Door
Racism and Violence in Cochabamba: Part IV
Luis A. Gómez
May 11, 2007
La Paz - 

Cochabamba’s central plaza is filled a calm place, filled with greenary. At noon, the traveling vendors hawk their goods, while dozens of people converse, seated on benches under the shade of aged trees. On the south side of the plaza, the cathedral’s façade basks in the sun’s rays while opposite the church stands an old and yellow building—the State of Cochabamba Governor’s Office. Inside, Manfred Reyes Villa sat to serve his people—calm until December 2006 when he called to support “Santa Cruz’s independence” and entered full force into the sedition game.

On normal days, the Governor’s office is bubbling with activity—those coming and going working out the red tape of state government. License plate-less official and non-official vehicles with civilian dressed but military-seeming men passing the time sitting inside, can be seen out front. But on Thursday January 4th, when an immense popular contingent occupied the plaza demanding the resignation of ex-military officer Reyes Villa, things changed considerably.

A public meeting was held that day in which thousands of people heard speeches from leaders of the State Workers Union (COD in its Spanish initials) and from Movement Towards Socialism (MAS in its Spanish initials) Senator Omar Fernández. The call was uniform: Reyes Vila had to go “because he no longer represented the interests of Cochabamba.” This large public meeting came out of a December 21, 2006 call to action put forward after the police repressed a previous smaller COD-arranged public meeting arranged with tear gas. During the apparent end-of-year truce, the MAS-aligned social sectors used their time to weave alliances.

Though the demand was that the Governor leave his seat (which he won with 47.63% of the vote), the social sectors there that day (teachers, land-less campesinos, coca-growers, farmers) decided not to storm the Governor’s office and held the meeting without incident. Their principle resolution was to create a Popular Civic Committee that would serve to parallel the official Civic Committee dominated by Cochabamba businessmen and upper-class. Also, as a show of force, the meeting’s attendants decided to establish a permanent presence in the Plaza 14 de September.

The next day, the coca growers from the Chapare—Cochabamba’s tropical region and President Evo Morales’ political cradle—were the most numerous sector. In the Plaza, they set up camp, and sat in the middle of the streets chewing coca, the sacred Andean leaves. The Governor, who forgets and then remembers the meaning democracy with surprising speed, held a brief press conference in which he reminded the demonstrators that he had been democratically elected and requested his term be respected.

The police in the middle of the dispute

They weren’t just in the streets during those days when only one faction of the conflict was present. The police were also in the middle of the dispute between the Evo Morales government and Governor Manfred Reyes Villa. As we reported earlier, this repressive body served as an accomplice in the January 11th violence, practically bearing witness to the so-called “democratic youth’s” aggression. But in reality, the Cochabamba police played a much bigger role than this.

On Thursday January 4th, realizing that the mobilizations were not going to be small and that pressure was rising, the Governor’s Secretary General Johnny Ferrel asked the police to “do their job and protect the Governor’s building.” It was a rather unnecessary request since for the past several days the police were already keeping watch over the property but a request that was noted in various articles including one published in the Friday January 5th edition of the largest Cochabamba daily newspaper, Los Tiempos.

Yes, it’s important to point this out because when the demonstrators in Cochabamba’s main plaza attacked the Governor’s building and looted some of the offices on January 8th, they were provoked by the police’s aggressions and by the provocateurs from inside the official building whom the Governor let loose.

Eye-witnesses interview by UB recalled that while the high command of Cochabamba’s police force kept watch from the building’s roof, one person exited the building, entered the MAS contingent and set off a tear gas grenade. It was there, after a few moments of running and dispersal, that the attack would begin. There also passed a brief period of tension between the police, the national government and the Governor, when a commander was dismissed from his position because of the aggression…but who was soon rehired by order of President Morales.

The Governor’s Conceit

Let’s back up a little, because on the restless and steamy summer Saturday of January 6th, the siege of the Governor’s building and the vigil began to plant its roots. Reyes Villa appeared publicly that day, after a week’s absence in the media, to say that his staff considered switching its headquarters to location other than the Plaza September 14th, but that he was not going to resign. “They can blockade and keep up their vigil for a year or two, I will not resign,” the Governor stated.

That Saturday January 6th, as President Morales described Reyes Villa’s performance as a “political error,”, the Governor made a statement that proved crucial for what was to come. An experienced provocateur, Manfred Reyes Villa declared that the National Electoral Court had given a green light for the collection of signatures to hold a new referendum on autonomy. That is to say: he reaffirmed his intention to call another vote on autonomy in Cochabamba —the original reason for the uproar against him. He also threatened to initiate legal processes against the social movement leaders and MAS-party Parliament members leading the demonstrations.

Perhaps believing himself to be a strong and capable Governor, Reyes Villa continued his brash actions on Sunday January 7th, announcing that he was to travel throughout the state in order to rally support for his government. In essence, he went to convince the rural population—a sector that voted almost 85% against Reyes Villa in December 2005—of the advantages of state autonomy.

Fire in the Governor’s Office

On January 8th, the U.S. ambassador in Bolivia visited Bolivian Foreign Relations Minister David Choquehuanca. At the end of the meeting, it became clear that Evo Morales’ government’s decision to demand visas from U.S. citizens wanting to enter Bolivia would not take effect anytime soon. Meanwhile, the struggle to elect a Senate President and the negotiations with opposition in the Constitutional Assembly were keeping the government and its party very busy.

Perhaps for this reason, no one paid sufficient attention to the incidents happening in Cochabamba foreshadowing the coming disasters. A march heading towards the Plaza September 14th was taking place: coca growers, campesinos, students and many other sectors were planning on reinforcing the vigil already made up of dozens of people “armed” with flags. The COD leadership led the march, along with MAS Senators Leonilda Zurita and Omar Fernández and with Cochabamba State Council members such as the current Justice Minister Celima Torrico.

When the day’s heat peaked at noon, the plaza was filled with humble working people. “It all started in front of the Governor’s office,” an interviewee explained to us. “Someone exited the building and exploded a grenade of tear gas. Everyone started running and a lot of people were trampled.” But the contingent re-gathered and attacked the building with rocks.

There are various—and of course contradictory—versions of the day’s events: the Governor and the police say that the people started it all. Though this doesn’t explain how some people were then beaten in other locations or how people were dragged or how a metal ball landed in someone’s eye. That day, 22 were injured, including a young boy.

Nine commercial media journalists were assaulted—and not by chance. Afterwards, some of the journalists unions brought complaints against the government for the assaults. Though they forgot to mention that many of the injured journalists were those who work for the government and their most gravely injured colleague was hit by a grenade launched by the police.

A half hour after the incident began, the then-Minister of Government Alicia Muñoz ordered that the police’s local commanding officer be dismissed and that the entire force withdraw from the streets. At that moment, the people went after the Governor’s building, lighting the main entrance on fire. The huge wooden door caught fire quickly and spread through the building, causing structural damage and burning various kinds of administrative archives and affecting the adjacent businesses.

At the end of the day, Reyes Villa and members of Evo Morales’ government expressed their regret for what had occurred, each side blaming the other (as they do all too well). Accordingly, various rightwing political leaders (like the Santa Cruz Governor Rubén Costas) declared that the Cochabamba incident was a symbol of the ongoing dispute for the country and for democracy (for power? asks this journalist).

Reyes Villa then returned to working far from public view. Over several days, he had meetings with Cochabamba’s rightwing leaders and various sectors of the upper class in a hotel outside the city. The government once again attended to the dozens of the on-going political and economic disputes it had on its hands. The dismissed police chief was given his job back. The people began to blockade the highways and various spots throughout the state. And the countdown to the beatings and shootings begins.